The apparent presence of the Australian gun in Israel indicates a Defence Department export approval would have been given to the company for the transfer of the weapon even if no formal sales have yet been made to the state of Israel.
Companies investing in or partnering with the Israeli government or Israeli State-owned enterprises risk being found to be aiding and abetting genocide or other violations of international humanitarian law.
The Greens’ discovery of a photo of an Israeli Defence Force soldier holding a DroneGun Mk4, as stated by the company itself, is another reminder of the urgent need to implement a full arms embargo on the State of Israel.
The weapon is made by Australian company DroneShield, a finalist in the InnovationAus Awards for Excellence 2023 in the Defence, Dual-Use and Space category.
DroneShield is a 10-year-old company that has become a global leader in AI-powered counter drone solutions. It designs, prototypes and manufactures dual-use electronic warfare hardware which can be used to detect signals, objects and vehicles of interest and to disable drones and other unmanned devices on the ground, in the sky or in the sea. It has developed a distributor network in around 70 countries around the world, including Israel.
DroneShield’s October 2017 Investor presentation document highlighted Israel as a target market in the defence sector. The document also highlighted Israel as already being a part of its distributor network. It also confirmed that it was involved in ‘ongoing negotiations with a number of large companies in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Israel and Sweden’.
Seven years later, DroneShield’s February 2024 Investor presentation includes a photo captioned ‘The Israel Defense Force soldier with DroneGun Mk4 and Rf Patrol’. In itself, it is not proof of a sale of any of the weapons to Israel, but it is proof of the export of at least one of the guns into the country itself.
Sparta Ltd, DroneShield’s local distributor in Israel, is ‘led by former highly skilled executives from the Israeli security and intelligence agencies’. Sparta confirms that as a ‘DroneShield provider we cover the drone threats for government use only.’ (emphasis added)
DroneShield’s ASX release of 4 April 2023 confirmed the DroneGun Mk4 was ‘available for purchase from today to qualified end-users, where lawful’, meaning that between 4 April 2023, when according to DroneShield the gun came onto the market, and February 2024, when DroneShield published the photo of the IDF soldier holding the gun, it presumably must have received approvalfrom the Australian Department of Defence to export that product to Israel for the picture to have been taken in Israel.
The Defence and Strategic Goods List 2021 (DSGL) is a compilation of military and commercial goods and technologies that specifies the goods, software and technology that are regulated under Australian export control legislation ( known as ‘controlled’ items).
A permit is required when exporting, supplying, brokering or publishing those items, unless there is an exemption. The DSGL specifies controlled items under 2 categories, Part 1 (Military) covering items that are specially designed or modified for military use, and Part 2 (Dual-Use) covering items that are generally used for commercial purposes but that could be useful in a chemical, biological or nuclear weapons program.
Exports of DSGL-listed goods and technology are controlled by regs 13E-EK of the Customs (Prohibited Export) Regulations 1958 ), and controlled exports require a permit from DEC unless an exemption exists in legislation
Given the DroneShield Mk4’s stated characteristics and abilities, and the necessary essential components and software required for it to have those capabilities, there is little doubt that it falls within many of the categories of the Defence Strategic Goods List (see for example Category ML11) and is a controlled export, thus attracting the requirement of a permit for its export.
The fact that the gun is pictured in the hands of IDF soldier in Israel means that it has been “exported” for the purposes of that legislative scheme, “export”encompassing both permanent exports (e.g. sale and delivery to a foreign buyer) and temporary exports (e.g. for demonstration, exhibitions, etc).
The time frame for the gun becoming available and its appearance in the hands of an IDF soldier in Israel squarely calls into question the persistent assertions of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong that the government has not issued any permits for the export of weapons – which includes dual use items – to Israel “for at least the past five years”. This denial is quite disingenuous if they are excluding the DroneShield Mk4 from their definition of “weapons”.
An attempt to get DroneShield’s response involved sending the following questions:
- Where and when was the photograph taken?
- Has DroneShield either directly or through any distributor supplied the IDF with DroneShield Mk4? If not, how did the DroneShield Mk4 come to be in the possession of the IDF soldier?;
- Has DroneShield (a) applied, and (b) received a defence export permit for DroneShield Mk4 to Israel? If a permit was granted, when was it granted?
At the time of publication there has been no response from DroneShield.
At face value DroneShield is an impressively innovative company, led by an impressively competent CEO, creating quasi-military products with the laudable aim of giving States a defensive capacity to save lives and prevent property damage. As well as the ‘gun’ itself, the company provides software and quarterly updates, and protective component field servicing and replacement. It also receives end-user feedback which it uses to update its algorithms.
Although Chief Executive of DroneShield, Oleg Vornik, may be correct to say that “our stuff is completely harmless to people” that does not mean that the weapon may not be used to cause harm to people indirectly. The problem for the company is the assistance its product may provide to Israel, as an illegal Occupying Power, to maintain its exclusive control over the airspace in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Any equipment and services it provides on a continuing basis would constitute an ongoing contribution to Israel’s unlawful occupation of Palestinian airspace and hence of the Palestinian territories, and likely also enhance Israel’s ability to maintain its illegal occupation.
Use of that airspace gives Israel the advantage of unfettered aerial observation of the terrain, the physical infrastructure built upon it and the identity and activities of residents. Simultaneously, it illegally deprives the Palestinians of the same rights, along with the more extensive rights they have under international law over their own airspace.
Control of the airspace enables Israel to carry out reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence gathering, mapping, targeting, and combat and bombing coordination. It prevents Palestinians from operating an airport and enjoying the benefit of being able freely to leave and return to their own lands, and it constantly intrudes into their daily lives, from the physical presence and noise of aircraft and UAVs down to interfering with radio and TV broadcasts.
Its monopoly on airspace over occupied territories means Israel can monitor activity on the ground and attack targets whenever and wherever it wants. It also substantially boosts Israel’s efforts to restrict the publication and dissemination of accurate, uncensored information about the carnage it has wrought in its invasion of Gaza.
This monopoly gives Israel and its hostile army (IDF) in occupied Palestinian territories the means to suppress the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, freedom and independence, even in the face of legitimate resistance from Palestinians in the occupied territories.
In para.89 of its Advisory Opinion of 24 July 2024 the International Court of Justice referred to Israel’s exclusive control of Palestinian airspace over Gaza, citing two earlier reports referring to the same issue, as one of numerous indicia of Israel’s actual control and continuing occupation of the Palestinian territories.
The Court found (para.93) the occupation continued when “Israel remained capable of exercising, and continued to exercise, certain key elements of authority over the Gaza Strip, including control of the land, sea and air borders, restrictions on movement of people and goods…”. The Court also noted the enduring duties of an occupying power, including (para.109)“Its basic duty to administer the territory for the benefit of the local population, and all the individual obligations arising thereunder…”.
Perhaps the most relevant right of the Palestinian people being infringed by Israel, and in which DroneShield may be implicitly implicated by its possible contribution to Israel’s control of Palestinian airspace, is the right to self-determination. The ICJ discussed this right in its Opinion (commencing at para.230), confirming (at para.233) that “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
The loss of its airspace to Israeli control certainly is one factor in the restriction of movement of Palestinians, and thus an element that goes to “…undermine the integrity of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, significantly impeding the exercise of its right to self-determination. “(para.239). The Court addressed other factual aspects of the occupation and concluded (at para.242) that “The Court thus considers that Israel’s policies and practices obstruct the right of the Palestinian people freely to determine its political status and to pursue its economic, social and cultural development.”
As in respect of the many other instances of Israel’s conduct scrutinized by the Court, the longstanding and continuing deprivation of Palestinians’ control over their own airspace must surely “…manifest an intention to create a permanent and irreversible Israeli presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (para252), which infringes upon their right of self-determination and which led the Court to conclude (para.261) that “The sustained abuse by Israel of its position as an occupying Power, through annexation and an assertion of permanent control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory and continued frustration of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, violates fundamental principles of international law and renders Israel’s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful.”
What does all of his mean for DroneShield? Even if its materiel is “purely defensive” in purpose, the uses to which it could be put by Israel are not.
If Israel has purchased the weapons and is using DroneShield in the illegally occupied territories, it is as a weapon against the rights and interests of the Palestinian people in a way that is illegal under international law.
The ICJ addressed the responsibility of various actors, including ‘other’ UN Member States like Australia, in paras.273-9 of its Opinion. In para.278 it said (emphasis added):
Taking note of the resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly, the Court is of the view that Member States are under an obligation … inter alia… to abstain from treaty relations with Israel in all cases in which it purports to act on behalf of the Occupied Palestinian Territory or a part thereof on matters concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory or a part of its territory; to abstain from entering into economic or trade dealings with Israel concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory or parts thereof which may entrench its unlawful presence in the territory; to abstain, in the establishment and maintenance of diplomatic missions in Israel, from any recognition of its illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory; and to take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory….
Any weapons supplied by DroneShield to Israel would facilitate Israel’s illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories primarily by facilitating its control of the airspace and also by its obstruction of the Palestinians’ right of self-determination; any acquisition by Israel of the DroneGun will further its intention to maintain the illegal occupation it has created, and entrench its presence, in those territories, and so DroneShield should not supply its products to, or have any trade relations with, the State of Israel.
Given DroneShield’s status as a leader in its field, the worldwide and increasing demand for its products and services, its ethical belief that its products should not cause harm and the fact that sales to Israel would constitute only a very small proportion of its global revenue – all propositions published in the material linked above by DroneShield itself – the impact of not having any dealings with Israel would be negligible financially but ethically profound.
The ICJ Opinion clearly says that as a UN Member State Australia has the obligation to prevent those trade or investment relations. If DroneShield declines to cease attempting to supply its weapons and technology to Israel voluntarily then the Australian Government, in compliance with its own duties as specified by the ICJ, should step in to ensure that it does so.
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